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ABSTRACT
A model of the public transport company in Oslo is used to the design a system of price 
regulations and subsidies. The objective is to provide incentives for optimum provision of 
public transport services both for peak and off-peak demand. Optimum is defined in terms of 
fares, level of service and average capacity per revenue kilometre. The cost of public funds 
and the fact that car traffic is priced below marginal cost in peak periods are taken care of in 
the model. The “regulator” determines the fares, the transit operator receives a subsidy per 
revenue kilometre, differentiated between basic services and additional services operated only 
in peak periods. There is also a subsidy per passenger in peak periods due to “underpriced” 
car traffic. The results indicate that it should be possible to have regulated monopolies in local 
public transport that gives a proper supply of services based only on commercial incentives. 
1. Introduction 
The last decade or so we have witnessed a strong trend towards privatisation and deregulation in the 
market for public transport in many countries. Major reasons for the change in policy have been the 
2inefficiencies documented in the sector and attributed to extensive regulations, public ownership and 
subsidies (Berechman 1996).  
In local public transport in Norway this has led both to contractual reforms with some of the (old) 
concessionary monopolies and to a gradual replacement of contracts with tendering. Fares and the 
total subsidies are still determined by local authorities as part of the general budgetary process. 
This paper deals with the issue of subsidies which was part of a study of contractual reform for Oslo 
Public Transport Company (OPTC). OPTC is a limited company owned by the municipality of Oslo. 
The company has a concessionary monopoly on public transport services within the City of Oslo and 
operates buses, trams and light rail.   
Up till now the subsidies to the company have been given as a lump sum from the city treasury. In the 
annual budget proceedings the City Counsel determines the amount of subsidies and the level of fares. 
OPTC has a flat fare system with discounts for prepaid tickets and seasonal tickets and rebates for 
children and elderly people.  
One of the tasks in the study was to propose a new mechanism for allocating subsidies and this is the 
main theme of this paper. Norheim (1999) gives a comprehensive overview of the whole study. The 
idea for the scheme proposed is based on the theory outlined in the following section.       
2. The implications of a first best social optimum for public transport 
Let:
Y(X,p) be demand in number of boarding passenger pr unit of time as a function of fare (p) and 
revenue kilometres per unit of time (X)
and   
C(X,S,Y) = the cost of the transport system as a function of revenue kilometres (X), capacity per 
revenue kilometre (S) and the number of passengers per unit of time. 
The number of revenue kilometres per unit of time can be taken as a proxy for the level of service. 
Increasing the number of revenue kilometres in a public transport system must imply higher frequency 
and/or better geographical coverage, i.e. denser network with shorter walking distances and more 
direct routes. Thus, while passengers directly respond to changes in different components of travel 
time, changes in the number of revenue kilometres might be a good indicator of this for a given area.    
Social surplus of the transport system is defined by: 
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pm is the maximal fare, i.e. the fare that will choke of all demand. W e must expect pm to depend on X.
A first best optimum is defined by: 
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The constraint on capacity can either be interpreted as a technical constraint or as a constraint related 
to the optimum degree of crowding. More realistically we may also divide transit riders in two groups; 
on group that travels on the sections of the network where the demand for capacity is determined and 
one group that only uses the parts where there is surplus capacity.    
Maximisation gives us 3 conditions:  
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The value of v(X,p) depends on the curvature of the demand function. W ith a linear demand function 
the term will be zero, and in general we may expect this term to be small. O is the Lagrange-multiplier 
on the capacity constraint.  
(3), (5) and the capacity constraint give us:   
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CY is mainly the cost of boarding and the second term in (6) can be interpreted as the cost of capacity 
per passenger. By pricing according to marginal cost and offering an optimum level of service, a 
public transport system will fall short of full cost recovery. Some manipulations of  (3) to (5) also 
show that marginal cost pricing and optimum level of service also implies that the fare can be written 
as:
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(eX and ep are demand elasticities with respect to revenue kilometres and fare)    
Except for the last term in the nominator this expression is identical to the one given in Larsen (1982). 
The crucial problem when it comes to public transport operation and the level of service is related to 
the terms: 
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These terms, which is the increase in consumers’ surplus from a marginal improvement in the level of 
service, represent an externality to a private operator which attempts to maximise profit. The operator 
will only be interested in the additional revenue from the increase in passengers, but the terms in (8) 
may be of the order 2-5 times the marginal increase in fare revenue. The terms are closely related to 
the Mohring-effect.     
Some rearranging of terms also shows that (3)-(5) and the constraint imply: 
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The right-hand side of (9) is approximately the cost of a revenue kilometre operated with a unit of 
minimum capacity. For a buss route this would come close to the cost of serving the route with a car. 
For railways this cost will approximate the cost per kilometre of operating a small locomotive.  
(9) only holds in a “first best” world when prices are equal to marginal costs. However, (8) will be 
present as an externality to the operator as long as we have a system where revenue only comes from 
fares and the level of service is determined so at to equalise marginal revenue and marginal cost. If an 
operator receives a subsidy equal to the right hand side of (9) and maximise profit with respect to X 
and S, with fares equal to marginal cost, the operators profit should in this case be:  
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With non-increasing returns to scale we should according to (10) have full cost recovery. 
This simple scheme points to two crucial and well-known facts: 
1. Marginal cost pricing and optimum level of service will not allow for cost recovery and the deficit 
will have the same magnitude as the drivers wage bill.  
2. Irrespective of fares, private operators will offer a substandard level of service as long as there are 
no revenue matching the increase in consumers’ surplus when the level of service increases.    
These conclusions should be valid for any type scheduled passenger transport, but the implications are 
most severe for local public transport where the subsidies in an optimum may reach 40 % of total cost 
or more.   
If we for the moment disregard issues of second best and other complications that makes the above 
model unrealistically simple, it is interesting in itself to look for ways to implement a “good” solution 
in terms of social surplus. It is possible to imagine at least 4 broad alternatives: 
1. A planning solution. This implies that a public authority decides on all parameters (X ,S and p) and 
presumably also owns and operates the system. The main problems with this solution are: 
a) The information on demand needed in order to have an optimum design of the system in terms 
of routes, frequencies and timetables. 
 b) The familiar problems of efficiency related to a publicly owned transit company receiving high 
subsidies. 
62. A planning solutions with many private operators. In this case there exists several possibilities for 
tendering, depending on what the public authority decides in advance and what is left for 
tendering. The solution closest to a pure planning solution is that a public authority decides on all 
3 parameters and chooses the bid with the lowest cost. However, these 3 parameters should 
actually depend on the cost of operating the system, i.e. on C(X ,S, Y) and the public authority are 
still left with the need for extensive information on the demand for public transport. In theory we 
can even also imagine that a public authority can accurately estimate the right hand side of (8). 
The only parameter fixed by the authority can then a subsidy to be paid per revenue kilometre, and 
p, X and S are left to be determined by tendering. In this case the winning bid should be the bid 
that implies the highest social surplus, but this presupposes that the public authority is able to 
undertake proper evaluation of such bids. The main problem with these solutions is the 
information needed by the public authority. 
3. A regulated monopoly. In this case we can imagine that the public authority sets the fares and 
provide a subsidy equal to the right hand side of  (8). This poses a problem of asymmetric infor-
mation with respect to the operators actual costs. Information on the operators costs is a crucial 
input in fixing both fares and the subsidy per revenue kilometre.         
4. A competitive solution. In this case the only parameter determined by the public authority should 
be the subsidy per revenue kilometre. In my opinion it is still an unresolved theoretical issue 
whether a competitive solution approximating a social optimum will emerge in such a setting. As 
opposed to a competitive solution without subsidies we should expect lower fares and an improved 
level of service. There is also evidence supporting the view that a competitive solution without 
subsidies will be unstable. A proper subsidy per revenue kilometre will facilitate exit and entry in 
the marked and to a large extent eliminate economies of scale that would otherwise impede 
competition. The crucial issue is the kind of route system that will emerge and the possible need 
for co-ordination of timetables.    
The model presented above is too simple to actually merit a thorough evaluation of the different 
options with respect to organisation of public transport indicated above. The issue of X-efficiency is 
important when it comes to the operators cost. On the other hand, the efficiency of a public authority 
when it comes to the "design" of public transport services is also a problem. The competence of a 
public authority in this respect is an important issue when tendering is used.    
A subsidy per revenue kilometre will seemingly play a major role if we want private operators to 
provide an optimum level of service. The drivers wages will constitute the major share of the cost that 
is the basis for the subsidy. In a system with routes operated at different speeds and thus having 
varying cost per kilometre, it might actually be simpler to have a subsidy per effective hour of revenue 
service.      
73. A model for the Oslo Public Transit Company  (OPTC) 
For the study reported on here, we updated and re-calibrated a model that I have previously presented 
in Larsen (1994). That paper also have a more detailed description of the model, which is basically an 
extension and numerically implemented version of the model presented above. The extensions are of 
two types. 
On the demand side we have three categories of passengers: 
¾ Passengers that travels on the sections of the route network that determines the capacity (per hour) 
for the system (YH).
¾ Other peak period passengers. (YL)
¾ Off-peak passengers (YOP). 
This means that there will be a “social revenue” for each type of passengers and the model allows for 
different fares for the three categories of passengers. An improvement would be to also have two 
segments of off-peak passengers, but data did not allow for this. The demand functions used implies 
price elasticities that increase with the level of fares and elasticities with respect to level of service that 
decrease with the number of revenue kilometres. Off-peak demand has slightly higher elasticities in 
absolute value in the benchmark situation.   
On the supply and cost side we distinguish between  “basic services” (B) that is all day services and 
additional services (A) that is operated only in peak periods. This is the same approach as Jansson 
(1979,1984) The cost per revenue kilometre (for a given capacity per revenue kilometre) is much 
higher for the additional service than for the basic service due to higher capital and labour cost and 
less efficient use of rolling stock.   
The model allows for different capacity per revenue kilometre for A and B and has two constraints:  
0:
0)(:
t
t
 poBBpo
pcAABBp
YSXpeakoff
YSXSXpeak
E
E
    (11) 
Both demand, the level of service and costs are initially calculated on an hourly basis and multiplied 
by the number of hours to arrive at annual demand and cost. Capital cost are calculated directly on an 
annual basis and there is also a fixed cost per hour the system is operated and a fixed cost per year that 
is related to the rail system.     
8The model also allows for a cost of public funds and for second best solutions conditioned on road 
traffic that is priced below marginal cost in peak periods. 
A major simplification made in the model is it treats services as homogeneous while OPTC operates 
busses, trams and light rail services.  However, this is probably not big problem with the cost structure 
used in the model.   
By solving a problem that is actually a problem of non-linear optimisation with non-linear constraints 
we can numerically find the social optimum for “1. best”,  with cost of public funds and second best 
when road traffic is priced below marginal cost. It is also possible to add additional constraints. 
There are two features with this model that are worth emphasising: 
1. Marginal cost for YH is determined by the cost of expanding the capacity of the additional 
services that are operated only in the peak, but average cost for peak passengers is 
determined by the mix of basic and additional services operated in the peak.
2. If we consider the cost of expanding services off-peak it means expanding the basic services. 
The additional services operated in the peak can then be reduced without violating the 
constraint on capacity and the cost savings from this reduction should be deducted from the 
cost of expanding the basic services. The implication is that the marginal cost of expanding 
services off-peak will be lower than the average cost of the basic services, and this also 
carries over to the marginal cost per passenger. 
The model was calibrated to the benchmark situation that is represented by cost, fares, level of service 
and demand in 1996. 
The idea behind using the model was to estimate fares and level of service for a social optimum. 
Subsequently to use the estimated fares and a subsidy per revenue kilometre for basic and additional 
services respectively and let the model calculate the solution for a profit maximum. According to the 
model presented in section 2 we expected that it would be quite easy to replicate approximately a 1. 
best social optimum in this way, which was also confirmed by model runs. However a more realistic  
case would involve both a cost of public funds and a second best solution conditioned on car traffic 
priced below marginal cost in peak periods. This is the actual situation in the Oslo area even with 
present toll ring.
Table 1: Maximising social surplus   
 CPF=0 CPF=0.25 
"Benchmark 
situation" 1. best 2. best    1. best 2. best    
Public transit trips-Mill/year :   A B C D E 
Peak – demand on capacity  24,75 22.4 26.8 17.7 24.9 
9Peak – other 8,25 11.9 12.1 9.4 9.8 
Off – peak 77,0 120.7 120.7 93.5 93.5 
Total number of trips    110,0 155.0 159.7 120.5 128.1 
Fares – NOK per trip:      
Peak – demand on capacity 8,20 18.00 12.10 25.30 14.30 
Peak – other 8,20 1.00 1.00 8.30 8.30 
Off – peak 8,20 7.50 7.30 11.90 11.90 
LOS-1000 rev.km per hour1):      
Basic services     3.0/145 10.4/64 10.4/65 8.6/61 8.6/61 
Additional peak services   4.3/185 4.6/87 6.5/98 4.0/83 6.9/101 
Peak total     7.6 16.1 17.9 13.4 16.4 
Costs – Mill NOK per year:      
Operating costs (dep. on rev. km) 1049.0 1940.3 2005.0 1552.7 1659.5 
Capital costs 206.9 194.6 231.6 154.4 214.6 
Fixed cost per trip 111.7 157.3 162.1 122.3 130.0 
Dependant on operating hours 32,9 32.9 32.9 32.9 32.9 
Fixed annual cost 7,5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Total cost 1408,0 2332.5 2439.0 1869.7 2044.5 
Average cost per trip  - NOK 12,80 15.00 15.30 15.50 16.00 
Fare revenue–Mill NOK/y:      
Peak – demand on capacity  203,2 402.9 325.9 445.8 354.6 
Peak – other 67.7 12.1 12.3 77.8 81.0 
Off – peak 632.2 903.6 902.9 1107.9 1106.9 
Total revenue    903.1 1318.6 1241.1 1631.5 1542.4 
Economic results:      
Profit–excl.subsidies-MillNOK/y -504.9 -1013.9 -1197.9 -238.3 -502.1 
Social surplus  - Mill  NOK /y  2867.8 2854.3 2180.7 2138.3 
1) Revenue kilometres/Capacity per revenue kilometre. Due to the fact that the basic services are slightly higher  on 
workdays than in the week-ends, the peak revenue kilometres comes out slightly higher than the sum  of  basic services 
and additional peak services.  
Table 1 shows the benchmark situation, the 1.best social optimum, the social optimum when the cost 
of public funds (CPF) is 0,25 and the social optimum when we add a social revenue for passengers 
that transfer from car to public transport in the peak. When the social surplus is calculated with the 
cost of public funds, consumers’ surplus is divided by 1.25.  
We notice that the benchmark situation have the same average fare for the three categories of demand. 
On board surveys by OPTC showed that this was the case with the mix of ticket types and rebated 
groups actually travelling.  The single ticket adult fare was 18 NOK in 1996, i.e. very close to the 
estimated marginal cost for YH. From the 1.best solution we also see that the average off-peak fare is 
close to the estimated marginal cost which is equal to the fare in the first best solution. 
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By coincidence the 1. best solution with cost of public funds greatly reduce subsidies from the present 
level, but the 2. best solution in this case brings the subsidies back to the present level.  
We also notice from the last column in Table 1 that the fare for YH is below marginal cost. This points 
to another problem if we want to design a system of subsidies that gives proper incentives to the 
operator. No commercial operator will be interested in transit riders that pay a fare below marginal 
cost. This is an argument for supplementing a subsidy per revenue kilometre with a subsidy for each 
passenger in this segment. 
What is clearly evident from Table 1 is that the present situation implies a "wrong" trade-off between 
operator costs and users costs. OPTC provide too low level of service in terms of revenue kilometres 
and too high capacity per revenue kilometre. This situation is not a result of poor performance by the 
company, but purely a result of political constraints in terms of regulated fares and allocated subsidies. 
When these two constraints are added to the constraint on capacity, virtually no degree of freedom is 
left for the company. However, as for any transit company in this type of setting, we can suspect that 
production efficiency can be improved.    
On the other hand, as also pointed out in Larsen (1994), improved X-efficiency does not necessarily 
imply reduced subsidies in an optimum. Marginal cost and thus optimum fares will also decrease and 
the level of services should improve. These adjustments will counteract the cost reduction when it 
comes to the level of subsidies. 
The model runs in Table 1 all show that the level of service should be improved at the expense of 
higher average cost per passenger. Optimum level of service will actually reduce the cost per revenue 
kilometre and increase the cost per passenger. This impact on costs points to a general problem of 
assessing the efficiency of public transport services.  
The last column in Table 1 was taken as the starting point in looking for a subsidy scheme that could 
be applied to a profit maximising operator.  
4. Transit operator with subsidies. 
We assumed that OPTC would remain a monopoly. This meant that fares should be regulated. Here I 
will only report on three of the options we tested. The parameters are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Fares and subsidies 
 Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C 
Fares:    
Peak – demand on capacity 15.00 15.00 8.20 
Peak – other 12.00 11.00 8.20 
Off – peak 12.00 11.00 8.20 
11
Subsidy per passenger:    
Peak – demand on capacity 4.50 4.50 10.00 
Peak – other 0.00 0.00 10.00 
Off – peak 0.00 0.00 10.00 
Subsidy per revenue km    
Basic services 10.00 11.00 0.00 
Additional peak  20.00 20.00 0.00 
Alternative C was tested because the management of OPTC was interested in scheme that gave more 
direct incentives for increasing the number of transit passengers. The fares in Alternative A and B 
reflect the fact that the present ticketing system has limited possibilities for differentiating the fares.  
If we compare the results in alternative B with the last column in Table 1 we see that this alternative 
comes very close to the social optimum both with respect to demand and to the level of service. On the 
other hand, alternative C is a long way off with respect to the level of service and has lower demand 
than B even though the fares are lower (present fares). An incentive system based only on a subsidy 
per passenger is clearly inferior to subsidies per revenue kilometre, as should be expected from the 
theory in section 2.      
A point to notice is the high profits after subsidies. This indicates that it is possible to reduce the 
subsidies. However, this should not be done by reducing the rates per revenue kilometre or passenger. 
The subsidy rates should be set with the objective of getting the operators marginal trade-offs right. By 
itself this will lead to unnecessary high subsidies. The profit in alternatives A and B is mainly due to 
the fact mentioned above of fares equal to marginal cost for peak traffic refer to the cost of additional 
services operated only in peak. A major share of the capacity in the peak comes from the basic 
services that have substantially lower cost. The best way to deal with this issue might be to have a long 
term contract that specifies the rates of subsidies and also allows for a fixed deduction in the total 
amount of subsidies calculated from these rates.  
Table 3: Maximising profit with subsidies    
 Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C 
Public transit trips-Mill/year :   
Peak – demand on capacity  24,3 25 ,0  24,2 
Peak – other 8 ,8 9 ,3 8 ,1  
Off – peak 8 5 ,3 9 4,9  8 7 ,7  
Total number of trips    1 1 8 ,4 1 29 ,2 1 1 9 ,9  
LOS-1000 rev.km per hour1):
Basic services     6 ,5 /7 3 7 ,9 /6 7  4,2/1 1 6   
Additional peak services   9 ,0 /8 0  9 ,8 /7 1  2,3/30 0  
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Peak total     16,2 18,5 7,0 
Costs – Mill NOK per year: 
Operating costs (dep. on rev. km)  1455,3 1655,7 1180,8 
Capital costs 209,6 217,5 203,3 
Fixed cost per trip 120,2 131,1 121,7 
Dependant on operating hours 32,9 32,9 32,9 
Fixed annual cost 7,5  7,5  7,5 
Total cost 1825,4 2044,7 1546,1 
Average cost per trip  - NOK 15,40 15,80 12,90 
Fare revenue – Mill NOK/year:
Peak – demand on capacity  364,6 374,4 152,9 
Peak – other 105,6 102,2 66,3 
Off – peak 1023,7 1044,2 719,6 
Total fare revenue    1493,9 1520,8 984,7 
Profit  excl. subsidies , Mill NOK/y -331,5 -523,9 -561,4 
Revenue from subsidies;
From revenue kilometres Mill NOK/y:                551,3                711,0  
From passengers Mill NOK/year               109,4               112,3               1199,5 
Profit  incl subsidies, Mill NOK/year        329.2       299.4          638.1 
2) Revenue kilometres/Capacity per revenue kilometre. Due to the fact that the basic services are slightly higher  on 
workdays than in the week-ends, the peak revenue kilometres comes out slightly higher than the sum  of  basic services 
and additional peak services.  
An obstacle to implementation of this type of contract is that the local authorities will not be allowed 
to decide on the total amount of subsidy in the annual budgets. Instead they are obliged to pay a 
subsidy that mainly depends on the number of revenue kilometres that the operator find profitable to 
supply.  
The results above clearly indicate that a system of subsidies can be devised that gives proper 
incentives for a transit operator. Such a system will probably be much better than any system where 
subsidies are given as a lump sum allocation.  
The regulator is still left with the problems of asymmetric information and production efficiency in a 
monopoly. If the subsidies per revenue kilometre are set too high, the regulator runs the risk paying 
excessive subsidies for a level of service that exceeds the optimum. In the case of OPTC we also deals 
with a publicly owned company. A system of subsidies along the lines shown here, could also 
facilitate privatisation of the company.   
A major advantage of having one operator is that different co-ordination of timetables automatically 
will be taken care of without further involvement by a regulator. The real challenge in the future 
would be to introduce some kind of competitive pressure in system while maintaining co-ordination.         
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